Historically, for Black writers, literary fiction has been a site for transforming the discursive disciplinary spaces of political oppression. From 19th century “slave narratives” to the 20th century, Black novelists have created an impressive literary counter-canon in advancing liberatory struggles. W.E.B. Du Bois argued that “all art is political.” Many Black writers have used fiction to create spaces for political and social freedom—from the early work of Harriet Wilson’s Our Nig; or, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black (1859)—to (...) the enduring works of the Harlem Renaissance (Toomer, Hurston, and Schuyler)—to the great revolutionary Black literature after WWII (Wright, Baldwin, Williams)—to contemporary Black writers (Toni Morrison, Edward Jones, Samuel Delany)—Black fictive space continues to be a necessary site for resistance. Black literary fiction is a vast counter-canon to mainstream literature which unquestioningly reinforces global white supremacy, capitalistic political oppressions, and the dominance/subordinance relations upon which they depend. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Giulio Castellani (1528-1586): A Sixteenth-Century Opponent of Scepticism CHARLES B. SCH1VHTT THE PROBLEMOF THE ORIGINS of scepticism in early modern philosophy has been a much debated issue. Sanches, Montaigne, Charron, and Bayle all contributed to the milieu which made it possible for the sceptical direction of thought to develop into such a potent force by the time of David Hume. The actual origins of modern scepticism, which seem to (...) go back to a slightly earlier date, lie in the confluence of several different intellectual movements during the early years of the sixteenth century: Christian anti-intellectualism, the reintroduction of the literary remains of the ancient sceptical tradition, the epistemological developments of scholastic nominalism, and certain inherent tendencies of Renaissance humanism. It is in the early decades of the sixteenth century that the seeds which later blossomed forth at the time of Hume originally took root. Hume himself merely reaped the harvest of several hundred years of sceptical preparation? Aside from certain manifestations of doubt which developed out of the epistemological theories of fourteenth-century nominalism, the origins of modern scepticism are generally held to date from the first publication of Sextus Empiricus' ancient summaries of Pyrrhonism during the decade of the 1560's. While it has previously been recognized that at least hints of scepticism were current in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the implications to be derived from this fact do not seem to have been adequately exploredT I shall not here go into these early manifestations of scepticism in a detailed way. Rather, I shall briefly touch upon a few little-known examples of the influence of ancient scepticism during the Reniassance and, then, I shall focus upon an early and practically neglected attack upon scepticism published before the first printings of Sextus Empiricus' writings. I shall discuss the circumstances of the composition of Giulio Castellani's anti-sceptical work, Adversus Marci TuIlii Ciceronis academicas questiones disi For a recent survey of early modem scepticism see Richard H. Popkin, The History o] Scepticism /tom Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: 1960). Of the large literature which connects scepticism with religious doubt during this period see especially Henri Busson, Les sources et le dgveloppement du rati~nalizme dar~ la litt~rature ]ran~aise de la Renaissance (Paris: 1957) and Don Cameron Allen, Doubt's Boundless Sea (Baltimore: 1964). The di.~cussionof this period seems to be the weakest part of Popkin's excellent book, particularly with regard to the treatment which he gives to Italian thought. See, also, his other articles, especially,"Skepticismand the Counter-Reformation in France," Archiv/fir Re/armationsgeschichte, LI (1960),58-86and "The High Road to Pyrrhonism," American Philosophical Quarterly, II (1965),18--32.In my forthcoming study, Gian]rancesco Pico (1469-1533) and His Critique o/Aristotle, I give a detailed analysis of the major representative of early sixteenthcentury scepticism. [151 16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY putatio (1558), which antedates the first printing of Sextus Empiricus by four years, indicating that scepticism was already widespread enough to provoke an attack from the camp of the dogmatists. Furthermore, I shall analyze Castellani 's arguments in the context of the philosophical views of the mid-sixteenth century. Scepticism in the Early Renaissance Direct knowledge of the major ancient source of scepticism, the already mentioned writings of Sextus Empiricus, was rare throughout the Middle Ages. There are but two known extant Latin manuscripts which date before 1400. s From the fifteenth century we know of two more manuscripts, neither complete in itself, but together containing a significant portion of the extant writings of Sextus. 4 This evidence indicates that Sextus' works were not well known in translation before the first Latin editions of The Oulines o] Pyrrhonism (1562) and of Against the Mathematicians (1569). With the advent of an increased interest in and knowledge of Greek in Western Europe in the fifteenth century, we find a corresponding increase in the number of Greek manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus. Consequently, by the time of the first printings, an appreciable number of copies of his writings were available. Some were brought from the East, but a large number also are attributable to European scribes. 5 We also know that in... (shrink)

Vattel's Mélanges de littérature, de morale et de politique (Thoughts on literature, morals and politics) was published at Neuchâtel by the Editeurs du Journal Helvétique in 1760 and this is the first English translation. It was republished under the title, Amusemens de littérature, de morale et de politique in 1765. Vattel's text provides evidence of his response to the issues facing Europe's states in the 1750s, and in doing so provides another perspective on his best known work, Le droit des (...) gens (Law of Nations) of 1757. Vattel emerges as a reformer steeped in debates about the future of the European state system, and particularly Europe's small states and republics like Switzerland. ☆ The text of the ‘Mélanges’ was translated by Kenneth Goodwin and Edwin Carpenter. Vattel's ‘Dialogue between the Prince of *** & his Confidant, about certain essential elements of Public Administration’ has been published in Vattel, The Law of Nations. Ed. B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore. (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, IN, 2008) and is reproduced here by kind consent of The Liberty Fund. (shrink)

In her paper, Robinson asserts that if one is convinced by the arguments assigning personhood according to a threshold criterion, one should also be open to the potential for a secondary personhood threshold, satisfied when one is pregnant, which confers temporary enhanced moral status. Rather than grounding such a claim on a fetus’s possession, or lack thereof, of personhood, Robinson argues that the pregnant person’s status as a ‘unique being’ is enough to satisfy the requirements of such an additional personhood (...) classification. 1 She justifies her claim via three arguments: (1) that the pregnant person is, in fact, more than a singular individual; (2) that pregnant people play a critical role in the human race’s continuation and (3) that the significant harms and burdens to which pregnant people have been exposed to historically and contemporary requires counterbalancing with enhanced protections. Unfortunately, despite Robinson’s best efforts, she does not... (shrink)

Interventions are medically necessary when they are vital in achieving the goal of medicine. However, with varying perspectives comes varying views on what interventions are (un)necessary and, thus, what potential treatment options are available for those suffering from the myriad of conditions, pathologies and disorders afflicting humanity. Medical necessity's teleological nature is perhaps best illustrated in cases where there is debate over using contentious medical interventions as a last resort. For example, whether it is appropriate for those suffering from body (...) integrity dysphoria to receive healthy limb amputations. This paper explores how one's perception of medicine's goal underpins whether interventions are necessary or unnecessary, using the controversial topic of therapeutic amputation as an example. By contrasting ‘classical’ amputations with their more contentious counterparts, it highlights how the idea of medical necessity influences and restrains clinical decision-making. The paper starts by giving an account of body integrity dysphoria, focusing on the debate concerning elective amputation's justifiability. It then introduces Georges Canguilhem's vitalist theory of health, paying particular attention to his emphasis on adaptability. Then, this paper uses his theory as a lens through which to evaluate the appropriateness of therapeutic amputation as a medically necessary procedure. Ultimately, the paper highlights how the label of medical necessity is withheld from potential therapeutic interventions because they fail to conform to pre-established ideas of medicine's purpose and that by doing so, potential harm befalls those who are left with no effective treatments and must look for solutions in the non-clinical world. (shrink)

Kögel et al propose a multicriteria alternative to the standard early clinical selection method for xenotransplantation trials. As they note, existing recommendations for inclusion criteria indicate that only the most seriously ill—those lacking any viable alternative—should be considered for xenotransplantation. Rather than basing selection on, to put it indelicately, a Hail Mary in the face of certain death, Kögel et al recommend a selection system based on four ethical criteria: medical need, capacity to benefit, patient choice and compliance (the latter (...) being an exclusion criterion). Taken together, they paint a picture of an ethically ideal first-in-human xenotransplantation clinical trial participant: someone ‘in need of a heart replacement with a good capacity to benefit from a xenotransplantation who [has] a choice in terms of alternative potentially life-sustaining treatment options.’1 In other words, they argue that potential xenotransplantation organ recipients (they specify heart, but said criteria would apply to any vital organ recipient) should not be facing their imminent demise as this would inherently constrain that person’s freedom of choice, thus rendering them vulnerable. Instead, Kögel et al argue that trial participants should be selected from groups possessing genuine alternatives to xenotransplantation but opt to receive an animal organ. Now, their concern regarding the presence of coercion in the context of what is an experimental medical intervention is fully justified, as is their claim that those facing limited viable choices at the end of their lives are an inherently vulnerable population. Autonomy and consent are largely uncontroversial bedrocks on which most medical and research ethics theories are built. We are, all of us, familiar with the horrors from history—both distant and recent—where participant consent has taken …. (shrink)

Cryopreservation presents the possibility of circumventing irreversible death through the body’s extreme cooling. Once cooled, this ‘cryon’ is then stored at sub-zero temperatures until medical kno...

Rodger et al argue for the disenhancement of animals intended for xenotransplantation; that is, the transference of tissues or organs from one species to another. The crux of their claim is that the conditions necessary to facilitate xenotransplantation will be hostile to those subjected to them. Thus, to minimise the suffering of living under such conditions, ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be (...) eliminated by other means.’1 In other words, if we can eliminate or meaningfully reduce the suffering of animals destined for xenotransplantation by obliterating their experiential capacity and lacking a less contentious method to achieve the same result, we should do so. When isolated, this argument is compelling. Suffering is terrible and should be avoided. Additionally, when we have the option to reduce another’s suffering—be that human, animal or otherwise—there are strong prima facie arguments that we should do so. This point is reinforced when we collectively are responsible for that suffering, as would be the case with xenotransplantation, and it is true regardless of how justified we are in causing that suffering. Thus, on the restrictive terms of Rodger et al ’s argument, I agree with them. We should eliminate, or if not possible, reduce, suffering wherever we can, and this applies to animals too. Having said that, when situated in the xenotransplantation context, issues with their proposal …. (shrink)

What system of morals should rational people select as the best for society? Using a contemporary psychological theory of action and of motivation, Richard Brandt's Oxford lectures argue that the purpose of living should be to strive for the greatest good for the largest number of people. Brandt's discussions range from the concept of welfare to conflict between utilitarian moral codes and the dictates of self-interest. Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

Opponents of the provision of therapeutic, healthy limb amputation in Body Integrity Identity Disorder cases argue that such surgeries stand in contrast to the goal of medical practice – that of health restoration and maintenance. This paper refutes such a conclusion via an appeal to the nuanced and reflective model of health proposed by Georges Canguilhem. The paper examines the conceptual entanglement of the statistically common with the normatively desirable, arguing that a healthy body can take multiple forms, including that (...) of an amputee, provided that such a form enables the continuing ability to initiate new norms of existence. It concludes that the practice of healthy limb amputation in cases of Body Integrity Identity Disorder is not only compatible with the goal of medicine but is potentially the only method of achieving this goal in the face of a complex and often mischaracterized disorder. (shrink)

In their paper, Hildt (2023) surveys several socio-ethical and regulatory issues arising from research into, and the potential emergence of, artificial consciousness—synthetic beings with a claim t...

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.

This essay demonstrates proof-theoretically the consistency of a type-free theoryC with an unrestricted principle of comprehension and based on a predicate logic in which contraction (A (A B)) (A B), although it cannot holds in general, is provable for a wide range ofA's.C is presented as an axiomatic theoryCH (with a natural-deduction equivalentCS) as a finitary system, without formulas of infinite length. ThenCH is proved simply consistent by passing to a Gentzen-style natural-deduction systemCG that allows countably infinite conjunctions and in (...) which all theorems ofCH are provable.CG is seen to be a consistent by a normalization argument. It also shown that in a senseC is highly non-extensional. (shrink)

Systems-oriented social epistemology, studies epistemic systems in which individuals work together to determine the epistemic status (true, justified, true beyond a reasonable doubt, e...

With a little help from British philosophers John Locke (1632–1704) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the author believes people can recover from The Incredibles a treasure trove of ideas that can help them think more clearly about tolerance, individual freedoms, and cultural conformity in their own world of incredible differences. On Mill's view, the “only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over” a member of society (against her will) “is to prevent harm to others”. If people follow Mill, (...) they have a reasonable but not overly restrictive principle for guiding human life and conduct. There is room to hold unpopular opinions, publish unpopular views, and belong to unpopular groups – even if society disapproves. These things are to be tolerated unless they have as their purpose harming others. But the PREFER principle will not give people that. (shrink)

The use of smart mouthguards in contact sports like rugby aims to enhance player safety by providing real-time data on head impacts. These devices, equipped with sensors, measure collision force and frequency, potentially identifying concussions that might go unnoticed during gameplay. The idea is that such enhanced monitoring will enable teams, physicians and other stakeholders to better protect players from the effects of on-pitch injury through immediate detection of head trauma and the long-term provision of player data. While we welcome (...) the move towards a better understanding of the potential harm that contact sports athletes may experience, introducing a new avenue through which information about player performance and health can be collected brings several areas of ethical concern absent from traditional mouthguards. In this paper, we consider four noteworthy areas: device and data efficacy, player choice, the inherent issues of such data’s existence and the harmful consequences of this data’s usage and exposure. We argue that failing to identify and address the risks associated with smart mouthguards’ employment in the elite sporting sphere not only risks the mistreatment and misapplication of player data but may also jeopardise the acceptability of a novel health monitoring method that has the potential to prevent long-term debilitating diseases. (shrink)

Scholars of ethics, and of human behavior more generally, will find this book consistently stimulating and rewarding.

Analytically inclined philosphers of religion have commonly assumed that 1) “God” must be defined before arguments for or against his existence can be evaluated 2) the history of religious beliefs is irrelevant to their justification. In this paper I apply the causal theory of reference to “God” and challenge both assumptions. If, as Freud supposes, “God” originates in the delusions of the mentally ill then it does not refer. On the other hand, if “God” originates in encounters with some Entity, (...) no matter how vaguely conceived, then That is God. (shrink)

According to an old saying, "We make a living by what we get, but we make a life by what we give." In 22 brief and insightful essays, Richard B. Gunderman shows us that the key to more rewarding giving can be found by looking beyond mere donations of money. Exploring the ethical core of sharing and examining its importance for both those who receive and those who give, here is a book to deepen our understanding of what it (...) means to share. (shrink)

This essay addresses the questions, “what good is religious ethics for?” and “what justification exists for the field?” in three steps. First, it canvases how religious ethicists have offered reasons for carrying out work in the field to identify anAnti‐Reductive Paradigmthat is guided by anEgalitarian Imperative. That imperative functions as a thin, minimal morality of inclusivity and equal respect that guides work in the field. Second, the essay considers the field's ends. Here the focus shifts from values that shape the (...) field'smethodsto values that can describe the field'spurposes. That shift requires us to think in terms of a thick rather than a thin morality, one with substantive rather than procedural virtues in mind. The essay offers a constructive, substantive proposal under the rubric ofCritical Humanism. Critical Humanism justifies the study of religious ethics as an enterprise that can expand the moral imagination through its encounter with difference. It is shaped by four values: post‐critical reasoning, social criticism, cross‐cultural fluency, and environmental responsibility. Third, the essay brings the two parts of the argument together by explaining how to connect such purposes to the thin morality of inclusivity and equal respect. One upshot of the essay is to have us think not only about values, but also about power as it pertains to scholarship in the guild; hence the attention to the ethics and politics of religious ethics. (shrink)

Most people interested in the problems of ethics aspire to two kinds of knowledge, one systematic, the other historical. They wish a systematic understanding of the field: knowledge of what are the various problems and their interrelations and knowledge of what has been done toward the solution of these problems. They also wish to learn what the great historical philosophers -- particularly those who have had the most important ideas about values and conduct -- have said about the subject. This (...) book is intended to enable the reader to approximate the achievement of these twin goals at once. (shrink)

Nearly four decades after David Raynor attributed to David Hume an allegorical Scots militia pamphlet from the early 1760s popularly known as Sister Peg, there is still no scholarly consensus about whether the author was in fact Hume or his friend Adam Ferguson. Using new evidence that has emerged since the appearance of Raynor’s edition in 1982 – including information about Sister Peg’s publication history, Ferguson’s handwritten corrections and revisions in the Abbotsford copy of the work, a 1767 newspaper article (...) by James Boswell and a copy of a 1775 letter by Sir John Dalrymple that both named Ferguson as the author, two volumes of Ferguson’s correspondence published in 1995, and a recently discovered letter by Ferguson from 1809 – this article seeks to resolve this controversy by establishing that Sister Peg was written by Ferguson, as his fellow militia agitator Alexander Carlyle asserted in his memoirs. In the process, the article refutes Raynor’s arguments about Ferguson’s supposed incapacity for writing a satirical pamphlet like Sister Peg and clarifies the nature of Hume’s views and actions in regard to the Scots militia cause during the Seven Years’ War. The article also throws light on several related issues affecting Hume and Ferguson’s circle. (shrink)

This essay critically examines justificatory arguments on behalf of justice for nonmainstream groups, focusing on two demands. The first is for mainstream groups to provide recognition by "fusing horizons" with the oral traditions of nonmainstream groups. Fusing horizons requires members of mainstream cultures to be transformed by the study of the other and thus to avoid ethnocentric evaluations of others. This demand involves the problematic idea that mainstream cultural norms and traditions are a priori morally deficient to evaluate alternative cultural (...) norms. The second demand is to provide group-differentiated rights on terms that aim to protect disadvantaged minority cultures because they provide a horizon for autonomous choice, not because their customs make a presumptive claim for others' recognition. This demand may produce legal rights, but not recognition in a psychologically robust sense insofar as it secures rights on terms that are foreign to the comprehensive goods according to which minority cultures understand and esteem themselves. The aim of this paper is to distinguish between these two demands, explain each as resulting from different specifications of equality, and suggest how the need to balance recognition and rights might occur in political practical reasoning. (shrink)